gentoo-ebuilds/sys-auth/polkit/files/polkit-126-realpath.patch

https://github.com/polkit-org/polkit/commit/9aa43e089d870a8ee695e625237c5b731b250678

From 9aa43e089d870a8ee695e625237c5b731b250678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Walter Doekes <walter+github@wjd.nu>
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 23:18:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pkexec: Use realpath when comparing
 org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path

This changes the pkexec path that is compared from the original supplied
path to the path resolved by realpath(3).

That means that "/bin/something" might now be matched as
"/usr/bin/something", a review of your
  <annotate key="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path">
actions might be in order.

Fixes: polkit-org/polkit#194

See also: systemd/systemd#34714
---
 src/programs/pkexec.c           | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 test/integration/pkexec/test.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
index 65c13090..b439475f 100644
--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
+++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
   gchar *action_id;
   gboolean allow_gui;
   gchar **exec_argv;
+  gchar *path_abs;
   gchar *path;
   struct passwd pwstruct;
   gchar pwbuf[8192];
@@ -508,6 +509,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
   result = NULL;
   action_id = NULL;
   saved_env = NULL;
+  path_abs = NULL;
   path = NULL;
   exec_argv = NULL;
   command_line = NULL;
@@ -624,6 +626,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
    * but do check this is the case.
    *
    * We also try to locate the program in the path if a non-absolute path is given.
+   *
+   * And then we resolve the real path of the program.
    */
   g_assert (argv[argc] == NULL);
   path = g_strdup (argv[n]);
@@ -647,7 +651,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
     }
   if (path[0] != '/')
     {
-      /* g_find_program_in_path() is not suspectible to attacks via the environment */
+      /* g_find_program_in_path() is not susceptible to attacks via the environment */
       s = g_find_program_in_path (path);
       if (s == NULL)
         {
@@ -662,9 +666,29 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
        */
       if (argv[n] != NULL)
       {
-        argv[n] = path;
+        /* Must copy because we might replace path later on. */
+        path_abs = g_strdup(path);
+        /* argv[n:] is used as argv arguments to execv(). The called program
+         * sees the original called path, but we make sure it's absolute. */
+        if (path_abs != NULL)
+          argv[n] = path_abs;
       }
     }
+#if _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
+  s = realpath(path, NULL);
+#else
+  s = NULL;
+# error We have to deal with realpath(3) PATH_MAX madness
+#endif
+  if (s != NULL)
+    {
+      /* The called program resolved to the canonical location. We don't update
+       * argv[n] this time. The called program still sees the original
+       * called path. This is very important for multi-call binaries like
+       * busybox. */
+      g_free (path);
+      path = s;
+    }
   if (access (path, F_OK) != 0)
     {
       g_printerr ("Error accessing %s: %s\n", path, g_strerror (errno));
@@ -1084,6 +1108,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
     }
 
   g_free (original_cwd);
+  g_free (path_abs);
   g_free (path);
   g_free (command_line);
   g_free (cmdline_short);
diff --git a/test/integration/pkexec/test.sh b/test/integration/pkexec/test.sh
index 4c76687b..e57b948f 100755
--- a/test/integration/pkexec/test.sh
+++ b/test/integration/pkexec/test.sh
@@ -142,3 +142,26 @@ sudo -u "$TEST_USER" expect "$TMP_DIR/SIGTRAP-on-EOF.exp" | tee "$TMP_DIR/SIGTRA
 grep -q "AUTHENTICATION FAILED" "$TMP_DIR/SIGTRAP-on-EOF.log"
 grep -q "Not authorized" "$TMP_DIR/SIGTRAP-on-EOF.log"
 rm -f "$TMP_DIR/SIGTRAP-on-EOF.log"
+
+: "Check absolute (but not canonicalized) path"
+BASH_ABS=$(command -v bash)
+ln -s "$BASH_ABS" ./my-bash
+sudo -u "$TEST_USER" expect "$TMP_DIR/basic-auth.exp" "$TEST_USER_PASSWORD" ./my-bash -c true | tee "$TMP_DIR/absolute-path.log"
+grep -Eq "Authentication is needed to run \`/.*/${PWD##*/}/./my-bash -c true' as the super user" "$TMP_DIR/absolute-path.log"
+grep -q "AUTHENTICATION COMPLETE" "$TMP_DIR/absolute-path.log"
+rm -f "$TMP_DIR/absolute-path.log"
+rm -f "./my-bash"
+
+: "Check canonicalized path"
+if command -v strace; then
+    BASH_ABS=$(command -v bash)
+    ln -s "$BASH_ABS" ./my-bash
+    sudo -u "$TEST_USER" strace -s 512 -o "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.strace" -feexecve \
+	expect "$TMP_DIR/basic-auth.exp" "$TEST_USER_PASSWORD" ./my-bash -c true | tee "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.log"
+    cat "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.strace"
+    grep -qF "execve(\"$BASH_ABS\", [\"$PWD/./my-bash\"," "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.strace"
+    grep -q "AUTHENTICATION COMPLETE" "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.log"
+    rm -f "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.log" "$TMP_DIR/canonical-path.strace"
+    rm -f "./my-bash"
+    rm -f "$TMP_DIR/preload.c" "$TMP_DIR/preload.so"
+fi